Transactional Leadership Practices of Political Parties in Indonesia’s 2019 Simultaneous Elections Democratic Dynamics and Political Pragmatism

Abstract

The 2019 simultaneous election in Indonesia represented a major democratic transformation by integrating presidential and legislative elections into a single electoral process. This study aims to analyze the implementation of transactional leadership within political parties during the 2019 election through the perspective of transactional leadership theory. The research employed a qualitative descriptive approach using library research and secondary data obtained from academic journals, regulations, books, and official reports. The findings indicate that transactional leadership practices were reflected through three primary dimensions: contingency reward, active management by exception, and passive management by exception. Contingency reward was manifested through political bargaining, strategic position allocation, and reward-based loyalty systems within party structures. Active management by exception appeared through direct supervision, campaign monitoring, and corrective intervention by party elites to maintain organizational performance and public support. Meanwhile, passive management by exception emerged when party leaders intervened only after significant political deviations or conflicts occurred. The study demonstrates that transactional leadership remains dominant in Indonesian political party behavior and contributes to pragmatic political culture during elections. Although such leadership strengthens short-term organizational effectiveness, it simultaneously creates risks of political patronage, elite transactionalism, and declining democratic trust. The study contributes to the broader discourse on political leadership and democratic governance in developing countries.